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Abstract: Wage inequality has increased across most developed nations; this has been 
manifested in a wide range of organizations and sectors, with implications for well-being and 
sustainability; within UK universities this has become increasingly visible.  There is 
increasing pressure on universities to deliver social and economic impact in an increasingly 
market and metric driven environment. In the UK context, increasing financial pressure has 
led to both an escalation of student fees, and constrained wage growth for faculty. In contrast, 
most Vice-Chancellors have secured substantive pay packages raising concerns that 
regulatory failures may be contributing to the rise. We show that V-Cs use their internal 
power within organisations to extract a disproportionate amount of the value created by the 
institution. However, we encountered much diversity according to the quality of governance, 
highlighting the extent to which not only contextual, but also internal dynamics drive wage 
inequality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A key theme within the current literature on industrial relations is of rising wage inequality 
both within and between contexts (Ackers, 2016; Stockhammer, 2017).  Although this trend 
is encountered within most developing economies, it is a very uneven one, reflecting both 
contextual and sub-contextual dynamics (Stockhammer, 2017).   In the UK Higher Education 
context, the gap between senior managers – above all, Vice Chancellors – and the rank and 
file, has become increasingly visible.   This raises issues of staff well-being, sustainability, 
and whether indeed, there is any justification for a divergence in the relative allocation of 
value (Edwards, 2015; Ackers, 2016).  As Guest (2011) notes, one of the core dilemmas of 
HRM remains the elusiveness of tracing links between HRM systems and performance (c.f. 
Boselie et al. 2005). Yet, the 2008- financial crisis highlighted the risks posed by 
inappropriate reward systems, and the need to find better ways of incentivising senior 
managers. Within UK universities have come under increasing attack both in the popular 
media and by politicians inter alia for a failure to be relevant to the needs of the ‘real world’, 
a perceived liberal bias, and because they allegedly provide poor value for money for 
taxpayers and students (Daily Mail 2017a; 2017b). As these claims have escalated, so have 
threats by the UK government both to place universities under closer regulatory scrutiny and 
provide more opportunities for private competitors as a countervailing pressure (ITV 2017; 
THES, 2017b). Within the UK, the issue of Vice Chancellors’ (V-C) salaries has been added 
to the mix: critics have charged that they are pseudo-public servants with few opportunities to 
really change the institutions they run, they are inattentive to the needs of students as 
customers, and yet are able to extract large pay packages relative to their colleagues on the 
‘coal-face’ (Guardian 2018; ITV 2017).  It has been argued that this represents a regulatory 
failure, making a strong case for external corporate governance reform (c.f. ITV 2017; 
Telegraph 2017). There is a considerable literature exploring the pay and performance of 
organisational heads (Shaw and Gupta, 2015), and a growing body of work exploring the 
remuneration of university heads worldwide (e.g. Cornell, 2004; Clements and Izan, 2008; 
Tarbert et al., 2008; Essaji and Horton, 2010; Bachin and Reilly, 2017; Ross, 2019). This 
study departs from this literature in explores the extent to which VC pay whether internal 
corporate governance mechanisms can make a difference drawing upon a variety of data 
sources covering the 2013/14 to 2016/17 period where information on governance can 
obtained.  
 Our results show that V-C pay is at least partially determined by internal governance 
mechanisms, performance metrics and individual V-C characteristics.  In other words, rather 
than a systemic failing, some universities seem much better at managing VC pay than others. 
We explore the implications of these findings for theory and practice. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE UK CONTEXT 
There are two broad ways in which the university may be theorised. The first is that effective 
research operates in a ‘republic of science’, which should be removed from commercial and 
social pressures that dominate in other parts of society (Polanyi, 2000).  According to this 
view, it can be argued that an independent intellectual class having the institutional space and 
support to generate well-crafted scholarly ideas is a good in its own right, enriching public 
and social life, and indeed, forming an integral part of being civilised (Oakeshott, 2004). The 
second is one that ties academic research – and indeed, university teaching – to immediate 
and directly visible economic and social development. This view that often equates research 
and universities as potential ‘engines of growth’; and posits that universities should 
concentrate on unlocking such economic potential (Perkmann et al., 2013).   
Despite some inroads by private-for-profits (and a small number of private non-
profits) the UK university system remains dominated by institutions that historically enjoyed 
both statutory recognition and ‘self-governing autonomy’. The latter, whilst not-for-profit 
and providing a broad public service, are neither purely charitable or purely statist (Moodie 
and Eustace 2011). In terms of charters and statutes issued by the Privy Council, internal 
governance structures centring on Courts, Councils and Senates were set up; in 1946 the bulk 
of university financing was taken over by the state, when previously their role was somewhat 
akin to charities. The 1946 changes opened the way for affordable mass education, but 
diminished the relative influence of lay Courts and Councils, supplanting their historic role in 
raising funding.  It also empowered senates, bodies dominated by senior academics, however, 
the role of the V-C remained closely circumscribed, with decision making now firmly resting 
in the hands of an ‘oligarchy’ of senior academics (Shattock, 2017). In the 1980s, radical 
changes to the funding environment led to the creation of funding councils as direct 
instruments of government, rather than autonomous policy organs; budget cutbacks forced V-
Cs to take closer direct control over trying to allocate diminished funding. The 1985 Jarrett 
Report cast V-Cs as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), and encouraged smaller and more 
assertive councils; on gaining university status in 1992 (Jarrett, 1985), the former 
polytechnics were restructured to concentrate power around the V-C (Shattock, 2017). The 
1997 Dearing and 2003 Lambert report resulted in the streamlining of Senates and Councils, 
ultimately diluting their effectiveness (Shattock, 2017).   
Perhaps the greatest transformation in university governance has been the transfer of 
decision-making powers over such policies to chief executive like V-Cs, and small teams and 
to ‘manager academics’ (Deem et al. 2007): inner cabinets answerable to senates have 
become Senior Management Teams, administrators have become managers. Evidence for this 
transformation can be found in a systematic shift to top-down reorganisations of academic 
decision-making structures. In two successive studies conducted over the 1993–2002 and 
2002–2007 period found that 74 per cent of institutions examined in the first and 65 per cent 
in the second had been subjected to quite fundamental restructuring involving reducing and 
merging faculties and departments, the creation of devolved colleges or schools and the 
establishment of new senior officer posts to be filled through public advertisement from 
outside the university rather than by election from within (Hogan, 2012). Between 1994–
1995 and 2008–2009 the proportion of university expenditure on university administration 
and central services grew significantly at the expense of expenditure on academic 
departments (Hogan, 2011).   
The alignment of evaluation metrics, most notably, the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) (Lee, 2006), and potentially, the National Student Survey, and revenue 
flows produced significant changes in university funding (Shattock, 2017). More specifically, 
the Higher Education Act 2004 led to the imposition of fees capped at £3,000 that were 
adjusted to £3,225 a year to take account of inflation by 2009. However, the abolition of the 
cap was controversially proposed by the Brown Review in 2010. While the Government did 
not implement the Brown recommendations it did extend the fee cap to £9,000, envisaging 
that a competitive market would erupt, with institutions competing on the basis of cost or 
quality. Following a failed judicial review against the fee rise it came in to effect in 2012.1  In 
practice this lead to most universities opting for the maximum allowable fee, and competing 
on the basis of reputation alone, often backed up by external metrics. Coupled with this has 
been increased competition for overseas students, again with the market disrupted by 
government action, in this case in the form of increasingly onerous visa requirements. 
 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
At the heart of their governance is the underlying fact that UK universities are voluntary 
associations with transient memberships; academics typically move between institutions in 
their careers, and students study for fixed periods of time (Moodie and Eustace, 2011; 
Oakeshott, 2004). On the one hand, this transience makes it easier to reconcile competing 
interest groupings, to sustain and develop a hereditary purpose, and makes for a great deal of 
resilience (ibid.). On the other hand, this transience makes it easier to bring about 
fundamental changes in governance; whilst members may resist changes, it is equally likely 
that the discontented will exit (or simply complete their studies). Finally, although councils 
may be akin to company boards, their role is, in relative terms, more circumscribed (Moodie 
and Eustace, 2011). 
                                                 
1 "Tuition fees case: Callum Hurley and Katy Moore lose". BBC News. 2012-02-17. 
Recent criticism of university governance can be divided into two broad categories. 
Firstly, there is an implicit application of agency theory: this argument suggests that students 
or external users are principals and their delegated agents, universities, are failing in their 
duties to them. Examples of this would include criticisms as to a lack of accountability to 
students as to how their fees are spent and a similar lack of “real world impact” that is failing 
research users (Martin 2011). On the one hand, there is little in the formal governance 
mechanisms of universities to suggest that students or research users are sole or combined 
principals; on the other hand, this view is widely prevalent, and arguably is likely to 
interpenetrate future formal or informal governance mechanisms.  
Secondly, it has been argued (sometimes by the same proponents of the agency view 
of universities) that students are consumers, and that the role of the government should be 
that of a champion and protector of consumer rights (Daily Mail 2017a). A strong emphasis 
is placed on the need to ensure that students get value for money and that academic staff 
orientate themselves to delivering optimal customer service (Woodall et al. 2014). Again, it is 
argued that companies or other users soften get poor value for money given the scale of 
investment in research (THES, 2017a).  
In both these instances, V-C pay has been drawn into the debate: it has been depicted 
as yet another example of agency failing (Daily Mail 2017a), or of a lack of prioritization of 
the needs of customers (Daily Mail 2017b). What all these criticisms have in common is that 
it is seen that there are sector wide structural problems which reflect failings in external 
governance, and that only tighter regulation, and/or the nurturing and support of private-for 
profit competitors, can correct the failings.  A championing of the interests of third parties in 
part reflects the effects of a decline in state funding: by moving to a system where students 
are a key financial contributor to the sector it is no longer credible for the government to 
present itself as either the principal or the main customer of university services, and hence, 
present itself as looking after those who are to justify constant interventions.   
If universities are demonstrably incapable of devising or operating sound internal 
governance the case for more robust external governance becomes stronger (THES, 2017b). 
However, if internal governance mechanisms can and do make a difference across the sector, 
then the case for external regulatory reform becomes less clear. Rather, two alternative 
arguments come into play. The first is the managing complexity argument (Oswald, 2017). 
Universities are large and complex organisations, and given the decline of government 
funding, are something akin to multi-million pound businesses. A complex and turbulent 
environment requires top managers, who need to be rewarded as such (Stone 2017; Oswald 
2017). Again, it has been argued that the need for better customer service requires V-Cs to be 
better incentivised; those best at it should be rewarded the most (Stone, 2017). More radical 
critiques argue that excessive V-C pay is simply a product of a surfeit of managerialism 
(Deem et al. 2007). The effects and effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms in 
moderating V-C’s pay, in ensuring equity, and in aligning it with real performance form the 
central concern of this article.    
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The review highlights an expansion of funds to universities in a period where greater 
marketization has occurred, but also that governance structures have not become more 
dislocated from universities traditional internal structures. With the decline of the senate’s 
institutional influence, decision-making has been increasingly located within remuneration 
committees populated by members of council and often by V-Cs themselves. Rather than 
contributing to effective oversight and restraint in the pay-setting process, a body of research 
suggests that remuneration committees are likely to trigger unintended mechanisms such as 
social comparisons and ‘bidding-up’ of executive salaries (e.g. Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; 
Gregory-Smith, 2012). 
 In the context of this study, rather than attempting to gauge the insider or outsider 
status of each remuneration committee member, a useful indicator of non-independence 
would be, as with the case of CEOs in firms, is whether a V-C sits on his/her own 
remuneration committee (cf. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). The non-separation of decision-
making and oversight roles is central to the agency problem that may lead to excessive 
executive compensation. We therefore expect to find a positive relationship between V-Cs’ 
remuneration committee membership and V-C pay.  
 
H1. Where V-C’s are members of Remuneration Committees there will be a positive effect on 
V-C salary.  
 
Recent corporate governance studies have incorporated remuneration committee size (e.g. 
Gregory-Smith, 2012; Kent et al., 2016), albeit without much consistent evidence emerging 
so far. However, the recent study by Kent et al. (2016) provides some impetus for further 
scrutiny. The authors conclude that a minimum committee size seems necessary in order to 
engage in effective negotiations on executive pay.  Larger committees make it harder to forge 
consensus around very high rewards, and place pressure on executives to justify their 
rewards. In the university context, an additional important aspect may be that larger 
committee size indicates a readiness to include a wider range of stakeholder opinions in the 
pay-setting process. This is likely to enhance both the quality and integrity of the process. 
Thus, we propose that the size of remuneration committees is inversely related to V-C pay.  
 
H2. Larger committees will, on average, be able to temper V-C remuneration.  
 
Open information flows align internal and external control, thereby reducing agency 
problems (e.g. Allegrini and Greco, 2013). On the one hand, greater transparency reduces 
agency problems by providing more information to shareholders and other significant interest 
groups. On the other hand, organisations that divulge more information to the market may 
impose additional costs on top managers, for example by reducing their future bargaining 
power in the external job market (Hermalin and Weisbach 2012). Powerful managers may 
seek to recoup some of these costs by demanding higher pay. Thus, even though disclosure 
may reduce agency problems at the surface-level, it is more likely to be associated with 
higher executive pay (Kanapathippillai et al., 2017). Hence: 
 
H3. Disclosure levels are positively associated with V-C pay 
 
In order to facilitate a strong link between pay and performance, it is necessary to have clear 
indicators by which to adjudge success against the mission of the organisation, and second 
there needs to be a clear governance structure through which agent performance can be 
adjudged (Shaw and Gupta, 2015).  However, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) argue that 
multiple criteria, with some targets easier to meet than others, could have detrimental effects 
on the principal’s welfare and augmented measurement costs. A major division in the UK 
university sector is between research intensive and largely teaching orientated institutions, 
albeit that the outer boundaries between these categories are blurred.  In practice, some 
institutions may prioritise effectiveness in teaching and outreach, and others may place a 
premium on overall research progress hence: 
H4. Pay is positively linked to performance measures that, in turn, will reflect differing 
institutional missions. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
Data 
We derive an annual dataset that cover the 2013/14 to 2016/17 academic years with our 
sample frame reflecting the availability data relating to governance. We excluded niche 
institutions composed of specialist arts and agriculture institutions as these had quite different 




Vice Chancellor salary - We use salary data (including pensions) for V-Cs sourced from 
The Times Higher Education Supplement. We supplement this with information on the pay of 
Professors, all academic staff and all staff from HESA (Higher Education Statistics Agency).  
 
Independent variables 
Governance structures – A number of characteristics of governance and disclosure are 
identified by consulting websites of each institution and from information requests to the 
University College Union.2 We draw together information on whether or not the V-C sits on 
the Remuneration Committee, the number of committee members and the level of disclosure, 
the latter as follows: Differing degrees of disclosure of the minutes of Remuneration 
committees in 2013/14 to 2015/16 to information requests of the UCU: 1=no minutes of the 
meetings were provided; 2=minutes are provided with redactions; 3=full minutes are 
provided without redactions. 
 
                                                 
2 Full details and reports are found at https://www.ucu.org.uk/V-Cpay. 
Performance – There are a rich set of performance metrics available, some of which are 
produced annually, while a large-scale research exercise tends to be conducted every four to 
five years. The time-series measures are extracted for the 2013-14 to 2016-2017 period. A 
general performance metric we focus upon is the Global University Rankings calculated by 
The Times Higher Education. This metrics does summarise a set of teaching and research 
indices. However, t it provides ranking of only a fraction of institutions, mostly research-
intensive ones. To capture perceived teaching ‘quality’ we supplement this with the National 
Student Survey, and more specifically, responses to the ‘overall satisfaction’ question. 
Institution level citations is based on publication data from Elsevier’s Scopus. The overall 
financial success of institutions is captured in income, expenditure and surplus of each 
institution with information coming from HESA. We distinguish between three different 
sources of income: funding body grants; research grants/contracts; and tuition fees. We also 
capture the enrolment of overseas students, especially for taught postgraduate degrees, given 
their importance as a revenue stream. It is plausible that V-C performance is partially 
evaluated on overseas student enrolments, given how lucrative they are. We choose two 
variables that are continuously available in HESA publications to measure such effects: the 
number of non-home/EU postgraduate and the number of non-Home/EU undergraduates.  
We supplement this information with cross-sectional performance measures derived 
from the results REF (2014) by the Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE). 
We examine two REF components, and (publication) ‘output’. As these data relate to two 
time periods, rather than being annual measures, we align them to the years where these 
would be available to assess performance (i.e. REF for 2015-16).3 
 
                                                 
3 HEFCE REF 2014 (http://results.ref.ac.uk) and RAE 2008 (https://www.rae.ac.uk/). 
Segmentation and Institutional characteristics – There is considerable organizational 
variety between the more than 100 universities in the UK.  ‘Old’/pre-1992 universities tend to 
have a strong orientation towards research (e.g. Oxford and Cambridge,) and ‘new’/post 1992 
ones more teaching or industry orientated (e.g.  Sheffield Hallam and Gloucester). To capture 
these differences, we segment between members of the pre- (“old”) and post-1992 (“new”) 
universities. We proxy complexity by the number of faculty employed and also capture the 
proportion of pay to administrative staff relative to total pay (Stone 2017; Oswald 2017). 
 
V-C characteristics – Using Who’s Who UK in combination with web searches we derive a 
list of characteristics that includes: whether the individual came from the private sector, the 
public sector, from academia, or had recent experience of working both in academic and in 
the public or private sector, whether the individual had been hired from a pre-92 or post-92 
institution, gender, age, country of birth, country located when hired, whether or not the 
individual had an acting role or a permanent appointment, the institution that the V-C 
graduated from, whether or not the V-C did an undergraduate or postgraduate programme in 
Oxbridge, the subject area of the V-C (science, social science, arts and humanities), 
individual academic influence (measured in year field adjusted life time citations taken from 
Scopus) and whether the individual has obtained a title (such as a CBE or Knighthood). 




Our dataset incorporates annual data from 2013/14 to 2016/17. Ideally, we would wish to 
estimate an econometric model for the determination of V-C pay which will distinguish 
between the individual’s personal attributes, performance metrics, different types of 
institutions and characteristics of the institutions themselves. We undertake a mediation 
analysis (general treatments of the methods are found in MacKinnon, 2008; Hayes, 2013). 
Specifically, we assume that one variable Y, depends on X and Z. Furthermore, X=f(Z, z1),  
expressed graphically as follows: 
 
Y 
B                       A 
X   Z 
           C 
We run several regressions: Y=f(X) we estimate the total effect of X on Y. Y=f(Z) we estimate 
the total effect of Z on Y. Y=f(X,Z) we estimate the direct effect of X on Y, once we controlled 
for Z, (arrow A), and the direct effect of Z on Y once we controlled for X (arrow B). But, since 
there is a causal effect from Z to X, for example, we would be interested in distinguishing the 
part of the total effect of X on Y that is due to the indirect effect caused by Z: That is Z affects 
X that affects Y. In this case, we need the estimated effect of Z on X (arrow C). 
In modeling salary we need to account for both how V-C characteristics impact upon 
the performance of an institution, as well as the direct impact of V-C characteristics on salary 
setting. To account for these, we provided a nested structure first estimating,
 
 
   𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡−1
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
Where Z is the one period lagged performance variables of institution i, where X are their 
determinants (in particular VC’s individual’s personal characteristics). Doing so enables us to 
extract the indirect impacts of the Z variables. Then we can utilize the predicted values of the 
performance models in the second stage estimation of remuneration: 




𝑖=1 + 𝑙𝑗 + 𝜐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
where (log)salary is the dependent variable – and the explanatory, X variables, are the direct 
impacts of V-C and institutional characteristics, Z are a set of performance metrics, l are 
regional dummies for regions, j, 𝜐𝑡 are year effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We pool the data 
undertake the analysis using Generalized Least Squares in order to optimize the efficiency of 
the estimates.4 
RESULTS 
A priori there are strong reasons to consider that the market is segmented between established 
research institutions and ‘new’, typically less research intensive, institutions granted 
University status as part of a reform of the sector in 1992. Descriptive statistics and pair wise 
correlations between the dependent and independent main and control variables are given in 
Table 1 between the “old” (pre-1992) and “new” (post-1992) institutions.5 The descriptive 
data shows that V-C remuneration is about 20% higher on average in pre-1992 institutions. 
V-Cs at “old” institutions have more than four times more citations and are more likely to 
have knighthoods. Some other characteristics are quite similar, but there have been 
substantive shifts over time. For example, earlier work pointed to 93% of V-Cs being male. 
While the proportion of women is still highly unequal the proportion of men has fallen by 
more than 10%. It is also the case that the proportion of V-Cs who were hired from Deputy 
V-C roles has fallen substantially, while the proportion of new appointments who were V-Cs 
                                                 
4 We did experiment with panel estimation methods. The data did not support random effects estimation. So 
given many of our variables are time-invariant the approach would greatly reduce the richness of the analysis. 
Also, we note that, while the key governance findings of the paper were maintained, given our length of the 
panel is small (less than five years) and fixed effect may biased and inconsistent due to the incidental parameter 
problem (see Lancaster, 2000 for a review of this literature) we were not confident utilising that methodology 
and have focused on a pooled regression analysis. 
5 The correlations between explanatory variables are not provided here as due to the extensive nature of the data 
set, but not particularly high. We also formally tested whether there were differences in means between these 
two sectors. Not surprisingly, given the magnitude of the differences in the raw means, there were statistical 
differences in the majority of cases. 
previously has risen by more than 20%. Other characteristics have remained relatively stable 
with the vast majority of appointees, over 90%, being either born or hired in the UK. It is also 
noteworthy that there are substantial differences in the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables between the two types of institution highlighting not examining each 
separately may mask differences in the drivers of pay within the sector.6  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
 Table 2 reports the results of the pooled Generalised Least Squares (GLS) analysis 
dividing between “old” and “new” institutions where we incorporate year dummies to 
account for systematic differences in given years having used the mediation analysis.7 Given 
the interest of the study is in determining the impact of a set of factors on V-C salaries we 
provide the second stage estimates here. The first panel examines a set of individual 
characteristics finding some substantial differences in how V-C personal characteristics relate 
to remuneration.8  
< INSERT TABLE 2> 
 
 Panel 2 examines a set of governance variables. It shows that V-C participation on 
remuneration panels does not appear to exhibit a direct impact on remuneration, however, the 
extent of disclosure has a well determined influence. The number of members on committees 
has a differential impact on each segment of the sector, with larger committees tempering 
remuneration in “new” institutions, but the opposite being the case in “old” institutions.9 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, we undertook formal analysis testing differences between the samples and confirmed (not 
surprisingly) that substantive and statistically significant differences between them. 
7 We tested whether there we statistical differences between the “old” and “new” institutions and found that 
there were thus validating our approach to the analysis. We also undertook sensitivity analysis excluding 
variable to check the stability of the results and found them robust. 
8 Other than being only of methodological relevance to the paper hence not being provided due to space 
considerations. 
9 We also examined changes in salary and found qualitatively identical results with respect to the governance 
variables. 
Panel 3 suggests that performance does have effects which are quite intuitive. In 
“new” less-research intensive institutions, total income is positively correlated with 
remuneration, as is ‘impactful’ research – however measures of teaching quality (NSS) and 
quantity (number of students) are not. In older universities, traditional measures of research 
matter more. 
 Finally, year and regional effects are jointly significant controls with F-tests of more 
than 35.10  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our findings corroborate the notion that remuneration committees have a limited impact on 
executive pay. We do not find any evidence to support the first hypothesis, i.e. that V-Cs are 
paid more if they sit on the university's pay committee. However, we do find some evidence 
that the size of the committee matters, as proposed in the second hypothesis. An explanation 
of the lack of support for the first hypothesis might be that the direct influence of V-Cs with a 
seat on the remuneration committee on their own pay is partially offset by what is likely to be 
a stronger engagement with pay issues, as well as possibly a greater sensitivity towards the 
consequences of high pay awards. Our results for the second hypothesis indicate that both 
larger and smaller remuneration committees may temper V-C salaries, at “new” and “old” 
universities respectively. While a larger committee is likely to dilute the influence of 
powerful individuals, thus making it more difficult for V-Cs to dominate proceedings if they 
sit on the committee, when systemic checks and balances are weaker (Kent et al., 
forthcoming), smaller committees are likely to have a higher concentration of expertise and 
may therefore work more effectively towards a fair pay structure, when check and balances 
are stronger. Our findings show that the former logic, which aligns with our hypothesis, is 
                                                 
10 We also experiment with OLS estimation which while less efficient does have the advantage of enabling us to 
obtain R2 which were a respectable 51.1% for the “new” and 66.6% of the “old” universities. 
more applicable at “new” institutions, whereas the latter rationale may explain the outcome at 
“old” universities.  Higher levels of disclosure, measured by the publication of committee 
meeting minutes, is associated with higher V-C pay, as predicted by our third hypothesis. 
This finding is broadly in line with the notion that disclosure is a two-edged sword with costs 
and benefits (c.f. Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012).  
We find modest evidence that institutional performance is related to V-C pay; this 
would confirm earlier work which suggests that under specific circumstances, material 
rewards can impact on senior manager performance (Shaw and Gupta, 2015). The finding 
that different performance metrics are associated with V-C pay levels at different types of 
institutions is broadly in line with our fourth hypothesis. However, we found that it was only 
in “old” institutions that rankings with respect to research outputs were influential, while the 
REF impact was notably more influential in “new” institutions. That ‘impact’ is more 
rewarded in “new” institutions may be reasonable, as it may be difficult for new institutions 
to be able to compete with respect to scholarly outputs, whereas there are clear benefits of 
being able to show a social and economic impact in the local economy and beyond: however, 
impact may be difficult to evidence, allowing more opportunities to game the system. There 
was no identifiable relation between the key teaching quality measure the NSS. In other 
words, ‘old’ universities are more focused rewarding research publication performance and 
‘new’ ones perceived impact, but neither do much in terms of two key measures of teaching 
performance, a particularly surprising finding in the case of teaching intensive institutions. 
Finally, we find evidence that the financial success of the institution was well determined 
only in “new” institutions, perhaps owing to their more fragile financial base. 
Through a systematic marketization of the HE sector and by encouraging an 
increasingly metric-driven approach to university leadership, policy-makers have created an 
environment where V-Cs have opportunities to behave as value-maximizing agents. Second, 
we find some evidence to indicate that V-Cs act in line with the managerial power approach 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Boyle and Roberts, 2013), suggesting that V-Cs will use their 
internal power within organisations to extract a disproportionate amount of the value created 
by the institution; this problem seems one most pronounced in ‘new’ universities.  We found 
that disclosure was positively related to pay: ironically this would suggest that calls for 
greater transparency in VC pay setting may drive pay even higher.  
Does this mean that there is a case for stronger regulation of universities?  It may be 
that other broader socio-economic factors are at play that are not easily identified empirically. 
Council members encompass individuals in senior leadership roles, whose pay has risen 
precipitously over recent decades.  Such individuals, who are well aware of the greater flow 
of revenues and growth in what is a highly successful sector, may be particularly inclined to 
reward university leaders for the growing complexity of their role. Thus, many of the 
classical arguments for CEO pay increases in the private sector are likely to play out similarly 
in academia (Cornell, 2004).  In short, VC pay seems to represent an inevitable by-product of 
the adoption of practices from the private sector; in this case, further marketization of the HE 
sector would make the problem worse, not better.   Again, the dominant effects of 
government regulatory changes to date has been to weaken the powers of key stakeholders 
(local communities and academics), and centralise it in the hands of university managers 
(Shattock 2017); yet, it is when the power of VCs is constrained that pay is better aligned to 
performance.  Finally, constant regulatory tinkering clearly makes the job much more 
difficult, and hence, may justify even higher pay. The academic influence of the V-C 
(indicated by their life-time citations) as a determinant of salary only in the “new” 
universities. This may reflect higher levels of academic influence being a scarce commodity 
in the new university sector. On the other hand, research-intensive institutions may have less 
need to shore up their credibility based on their V-C’s own research reputation; it also makes 
the distinction between the VC and the rank and file professoriate less pronounced.   
Students are the most transitory members of a university community and a focus on 
their concerns may, at the least, open issues of continuity; however, of all the reward metrics, 
teaching quality appears to be the least influential.  This article does not explore what would 
happen if association members – that is, students and staff - genuinely ran universities. 
Again, the choice of performance metrics is likely to vary greatly according to the relative 
representation of association members.  Finally, at a theoretical level, there are clear 
limitations in the application of agency theory to universities; there remains a lack of clarity 
as to who the principals really are (are they simply association members?), and it is difficult 
to reach conclusions as to the scale of any agency problems given this.   This would suggest 
that alternative approaches for understanding universities and how they are governed, either 
as ‘republics of science’ who have, over centuries, developed viable and sustainable 
governance models (Polanyi, 2000) and/or simply a social good that deserves sustaining 
whatever its imperfections (Oakeshott, 2004).  We also encountered much heterogeneity in 
the sector, most notably in terms of the divide between “new” and “old” institutions; the 
latter have more robust internal governance structures.  If the core function of the university 
is research and teaching, then some are much better at incentivising VCs this than others. 
This diversity would indicate that universities are indeed capable of devising internal 
governance solutions. At the same time, the modest and uneven linkages between pay and 
performance would indicate the basis of a case for pay restraint. 
Limitations and future research 
Our study is based on a survey of academics in a single country and this is an important 
limitation to the generalizability of our findings. However, the UK has been at the forefront 
of developing research assessment systems, and it has sought to institutionalize their 
assessment on a recurring cycle, for example incorporating impact in its latest round (Hicks 
2012); it has also developed a system for grading teaching quality, the Teaching Excellence 
Framework. As such, UK institutions are perhaps ‘canaries in the mine’ for academics in 
other contexts where such assessment systems are being put in place. 
 A performance pay approach assumes that performance can indeed be measured. A 
central theme of the industrial relations literature is that this can never fully be so, and that 
attempts to measure it may have perverse consequences (c.f. Hyman, 2018). We have used a 
series of measures relevant to the UK universities context’ however each has its own set of 
limitations and has been criticised in the literature. For example, York (2009) points to 
limitations in the NSS, while Bell and Brooks (2017) also point to methodological issues with 
the measure. We cannot conclude that the lack of influence of teaching metrics means that 
universities do not take teaching seriously; rather, it could be that this reflects the challenges 
of accurately measuring teaching quality and/or the lack of legitimacy externally imposed 
metrics have within the sector. Indeed, policy makers considering the development of further 
performance metrics to judge universities by would be well advised to reflect further on this 
question. There is a substantive literature highlighting the limits of both peer review and 
citation-based metrics. Thus, even if UK universities have become more corporatist in their 
objectives it does not necessarily mean that finding a limited relationship between pay and 
performance of V-C is inherently bad; taking account of a wider range of measures might 
indicate a better – or worse – alignment between performance and pay. 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) argue that, within owner controlled firms, pay is much 
better aligned to performance than in managerially controlled ones. It could be argued that 
the misalignment between V-C pay and performance indeed reflects a product of excessive 
managerial power, rather than owner control.  However, this raises the question as to who 
really owns universities. If one returns to their role as voluntary associations, then this would 
be defined as their transient memberships (Moodie and Eustace 2011). Although this could 
be contested, the alternatives would be council members or government. Although councils 
may have a formal role as supreme governing bodies, members generally lack de facto, if not 
de jure accountability.  Meanwhile, constant shifts in UK government higher education 
policy would suggest the elusiveness of sustainable regulatory fixes.     
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Salary (excluding pension) 241,342         298,256        
Individual Characteristics
Gender (Male=1) 0.81 0.23 * 0.81 -0.14 *
Age at appointment 57.81 0.03 60.74 0.22 *
Tenure 6.56 0.12 * 6.39 0.01
Tenure (Squared) 43.03 0.11 * 40.78 0.26 *
Academic Influence  (life 
time citations) 1,078             0.22 * 4,432            0.23 *
Title Knighthood 0.06 0.10 * 0.23 0.22 *
Public Honours 0.35 0.14 * 0.22 0.01
Previous occupation VC 0.38 -0.09 0.37 0.09
(role) Deputy VC 0.35 0.03 0.25 -0.21 *
Other HE 0.12 0.13 * 0.32 0.06 *
Other 0.15 -0.03 0.05 0.08
Previous occupation Public 0.12 0.06 0.10 -0.01
(sector) Private 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.16
HE 0.77 -0.18 * 0.75 -0.04
Private and HE 0.06 0.15 * 0.14 0.02
Born in UK 0.87 -0.02 0.79 -0.04
Hired from UK 0.94 -0.05 0.85 -0.15
Academic Background Science 0.35 0.06 0.61 0.08
Social Science 0.10 0.09 0.23 -0.12
Arts and Humanities 0.49 -0.18 * 0.16 0.02
Oxbridge (UG or PG) 0.22 0.11 * 0.38 -0.05
Acting VC 0.03 -0.35 * 0.04 -0.16 *
Internal Candidate 0.21 -0.09 0.18 -0.11
Entrant 0.12 -0.11 * 0.16 -0.10
Governance (Remuneration Committee)
VC on committee 0.57 0.12 * 0.82 0.03
No. of members 5.64 -0.08 * 6.48 0.08
No Minutes 0.43 -0.02 * 0.50 0.00
Provide Minutes (with retracations) 0.38 -0.08 * -0.03 0.05
Provide Minutes (no retractions) 0.31 -0.02 * 0.16 0.06 *
Average Faculty Salary 47,192           0.03 49,456          0.10
Performance Characteristics (t-1)
Overall Total Income 156,404         0.28 * 420,421        0.21 *
Research Total Citations 20.8 0.20 * 56.0 0.13 *
Funding Body Grants 69,990           0.20 * 140,349        0.23 *
REF Outputs (GPA) 94.63 -0.23 * 36.16 -0.15 *
REF Impact 78.43 -0.24 * 33.43 -0.11 *
Change between RAE2008 & 
REF2014 -1.62 -0.01 * 0.81 0.22 *
Teaching NSS 85.18 0.06 88.35 -0.08
No. Non-UK Postgraduate students 3,518             0.20 * 4,656            0.28 *
No. Non-UK Undergraduate students 719                0.25 * 2,085            0.41
Tuition fees income 52,004           0.28 * 95,126          0.34 *
Other
Insitutional complexity No. of Staff (FTE) 2,298             0.30 * 4,860            0.26 *
Administrative burden Academic to administative staff ratio 2.02 0.12 * 1.95 -0.04
N 365 146
Table 2. Determinants of (log)salary (Estimated using GLS) 
 
Notes: The GLS estimations assume a Gaussian (normal) distribution. White adjusted standard errors. 
 
 
Variable Name Measurement "New" universities "Old" universities
Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat
Individual Characteristics
Gender Gender (Male=1) -0.014 (0.25) -0.251 ** (2.28)
Age	at	appointment Years -0.002 (0.36) 0.001 (0.84)
Tenure 0.044 ** (2.37) 0.104 * (1.82)
Tenure	(Squared) -0.002 (1.58) -0.005 (1.62)
Academic	Influence	(000s) 0.032 *** (3.07) 0.006 *** (2.89)
Titular	Status Knighthood 0.059 (0.78) -0.048 (0.38)
Public	Honours 0.055 (1.38) 0.045 (0.41)
Previous	occupation Deputy	VC 0.119 ** (2.01) -0.178 (1.44)
(role)	-Ref.	VC Other	HE 0.184 (1.44) 0.041 (0.33)
Other 0.021 (0.14) 0.100 (0.59)
Previous	occupation Public -0.022 (0.18) 0.037 (0.23)
(sector) Private -0.148 (1.24) 0.157 (1.27)
Ref.	HE Private	and	HE -0.016 (0.19) -0.197 (1.44)
Born	in Ref.	UK -0.015 (0.26) 0.153 (1.38)
Hired	from Ref.	UK 0.175 * (1.64) -0.262 (1.38)
Academic	Background Social	Science -0.239 ** (2.39) -0.137 (1.60)
Ref.	Science Arts	and	Humanities -0.058 (0.42) -0.203 * (1.70)
Other -0.131 (1.39) 0.000
Oxbridge	(UG	or	PG) 0.000 (0.33) -0.037 ** (1.98)
Acting	VC -0.403 (1.10) -0.603 (1.24)
Internal	Candidate -0.050 (1.23) 0.059 (0.44)
Entrant -0.070 (0.91) 0.000 (1.34)
Governance VC on committee 0.042 (1.20) 0.208 (1.35)
(Ref.	No	minute	provided) Provide Minutes (with redacations) 0.065 *** (3.29) 0.166 * (1.86)
Provide Minutes (no redractions) 0.109 ** (2.17) 0.170 ** (2.33)
No. of members -0.084 ** (2.47) -0.053 (1.56)
Relative	salary Average	Faculty	Salary 0.002 (0.97) -0.003 (0.08)
Overall Income	(mn) 0.142 *** (2.60) -0.073 (0.51)
Research Total	Citations	(000s) 0.038 (0.36) 0.001 * (1.77)
Research grants (000s) 0.003 *** (3.43) 0.001 * (1.70)
Change	between	RAE2008	and	REF2014 -0.001 (0.44) 0.001 * (1.78)
RAE/REF	Outputs 0.001 (1.49) 0.007 ** (2.22)
REF	Impact -0.002 (1.65) -0.002 *** (2.54)
Teaching NSS 0.003 (0.40) 0.007 (1.13)
TEF 0.056 (1.99) -0.081 (1.35)
No.	Non-UK	Postgraduate	students	(000s) 0.001 (1.03) 0.000 (0.21)
No.	Non-UK	Undergraduate	students	(000s) 0.000 (0.97) 0.005 (0.17)
Tuition fees income (mn) 0.315 *** (3.31) 0.464 (0.96)
Insitutional	complexity No.	of	Staff	(FTE,	000s) 0.035 (0.77) 0.012 (0.60)
Administrative	burden
Ratio	of	Academic	Staff	to	Administative	
Staff 0.066 *** (2.77) 0.034 (0.32)




Log pseudolikelihood -25.39 36.31
